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1Abstract. This paper characterizesthe conditions for risk aversion in cumulative prospect
theory where risk aversion is deﬁned in the strong sense ([27]). Under weaker assumptions
than diﬀerentiability we show that risk aversion implies convex weighting functions for
gains and for losses but not necessarily a concave utility function. Also, we investigate the
exact relationship between loss aversion and risk aversion. We illustrate the analysis by
considering two special cases of cumulative prospect theory and show that risk aversion
and convex utility may coexist.
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21 Introduction
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) has nowadays become the most prominent alternative
to expected utility (EU). It is widely used in empirical research and various axiomatic
characterizations of CPT have been proposed ( [21], [22], [33], [34], [5], [29], and [30]).
The paradoxes of Allais [1] and Ellsberg [11] are resolved under CPT, as well as the
coexistence of gambling and insurance ([13]). The equity premium puzzle ([23]), the
overtime premium puzzle ([8]), the status quo bias ([28]), and the endowment eﬀect ([32])
can all be accommodated under CPT.
Another popular alternative to expected utility is the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model of Quiggin [25]. RDU generalizes EU by introducing a weighting function which
transforms cumulative probabilities. CPT is even more general than RDU by allowing
additionally for sign-dependence (there exist two separate weighting functions, one for
gains and one for losses, which do not need to coincide) and reference-dependence (utility
is deﬁned on deviations from a status quo, i.e. on gains and losses, and not on ﬁnal
wealth positions). Due to reference-dependence a decision maker in the CPT framework
can exhibit loss aversion which means that the utility of a loss weights more heavily than
the utility of a corresponding gain.
There exist various theoretical applications of RDU in the literature, especially in
the context of insurance economics. These applications have shown that RDU generates
results which diﬀer substantially from those derived in the expected utility framework
and in many cases these results provide a better accommodation of observed data. In
general, the theoretical applications of RDU — and even those of EU — assume strong risk
aversion. An individual exhibits strong risk aversion if she or he always dislikes mean-
3preserving spreads in risk (cf. [27]). Chew, Karni and Safra [6] have shown that strong
risk aversion is satisﬁed within the RDU framework if and only if the utility function is
concave and the weighting function is convex. In contrast, strong risk aversion has not
yet been analyzed for CPT and the goal of the present paper is to ﬁll this gap. It is
useful to derive the conditions for strong risk aversion under CPT in order to improve our
understanding of this model. Moreover, since most theoretical applications of RDU and
EU assume strong risk aversion it is reasonable to do the same for CPT in order to make
the results comparable.
Our main result shows that the conditions for strong risk aversion under CPT and RDU
coincide if we consider only gains or if we consider only losses, i.e. utility is concave on the
domain of gains and also concave in the domain of losses and both weighting functions are
convex. However, this result generalizes the ﬁnding of Chew, Karni, and Safra [6] since
we do not employ any diﬀerentiability assumption. If gains and losses are considered
simultaneously, surprisingly utility does not need to be concave; in extreme cases strong
risk aversion and convex utility may coexist under CPT. This result is noteworthy since
Chateauneuf and Cohen [3] tried to derive the coexistence of risk aversion and convex
utility under RDU. They have shown that RDU is compatible with convex utility only in
the presence of weak risk aversion (i.e. any lottery is dispreferred to its expected value)
while strong risk aversion forces utility to be concave everywhere. Moreover, our results
show that there exists a particular relationship between strong risk aversion and loss
aversion: in general, strong risk aversion is compatible with loss seeking, while utility is
concave if and only if loss aversion holds. Surprisingly, the relationship between strong
risk aversion and loss aversion is characterized by the ratio of the left and right derivative
of the utility function at zero. Theoretical arguments have motivated K¨ obberling and
4Wakker [18] to propose this ratio as index of loss aversion. Our results support their
proposal since in our framework this index of loss aversion arises naturally.
In order to shed some more light on the consequences of strong risk aversion in the
CPT framework we consider two speciﬁc variants of the model. In the ﬁrst variant utility
is a linear/exponential function, and in the second case it is a power function. By incor-
porating strong risk aversion these variants lead to examples where the utility function is
non-concave, in particular loss seeking behavior is allowed in a region around the status
quo. In the case of the power function utility becomes linear for gains and linear for losses
with a possible kink at the status quo.
One may argue that the analysis of loss aversion in the CPT framework is of less
interest since the value function in prospect theory and CPT is usually proposed to be
convex in order to accommodate empirical observed risk seeking for losses ([16], [33]).
However, many empirical studies found linear utility for small losses ([10], [15], [31], [7],
[36], and [20]). Moreover, it seems to be commonly agreed that utility is linear, at least for
small stakes ([19], [12], [17]). Theoretical arguments for linear utility have been provided
by Hansson [14] and Rabin [26]. Additionally, there seems to be some evidence that a
decision maker, who initially is risk seeking in the loss domain, changes attitudes towards
risk while gaining experience. This fact has lead Myagkov and Plott [24] to formulate the
conjecture that “with experience, risk seeking in the losses evolves into either risk-neutral
or risk-averse behavior.” These empirical ﬁndings as well as the fact that the theoretical
applications of RDU and EU assume strong risk aversion indicate that strong risk aversion
should also be analyzed in the CPT framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the CPT model
and derive our main results. Section 3 considers the consequences of strong risk aversion
5for the two special variants of CPT mentioned above. All proofs are presented in the
Appendix.
2 Cumulative Prospect Theory and Risk Aversion
In this section we recall the general cumulative prospect theory model for decision under
risk. It is assumed that a decision maker has a preference relation over lotteries. A lottery
is a ﬁnite probability distribution over the set of monetary outcomes (here identiﬁed
with the set of real numbers, IR). It is represented by P := (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) meaning
that probability pj is assigned to outcome xj, for j =1 ,...,n. The probabilities pj are
nonnegative and sum to one. With this notation we implicitly assume that outcomes are
ranked in decreasing order, i.e., x1 > ···> xn. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the status quo is given by zero. Therefore, we refer to positive outcomes as gains and to
negative outcomes as losses.
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) holds if the decision maker evaluates lotteries by
the following functional.
(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) 7→
n X
j=1
πjU(xj),
where U is the utility function and the πj’s are decision weights.
The utility function assigns to each outcome a real value, in particular U(0) = 0, and
it is assumed that utility is strictly increasing and continuous.
The decision weights are generated by probability weighting functions w+,w −. These
functions map the interval of probabilities [0,1] into itself, they are strictly increasing and
satisfy w+(0) = w−(0) = 0, and w+(1) = w−(1) = 1. For a lottery (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n),
the decision weights are deﬁned as follows. There exists some k ∈ {0,...,n} such that
6x1 > ···> xk > 0 >x k+1 > ···> xn. Then
πj =

  
  
w+(p1 + ···+ pj) − w+(p1 + ···+ pj−1), if j 6 k,
w−(p1 + ···+ pj) − w−(p1 + ···+ pj−1), if j>k .
Under CPT utility is a ratio scale, i.e., it is unique up to multiplication by a positive
constant, and the weighting functions are uniquely determined.
Several axiomatizations of CPT can be found in the literature. To derive the general
functional form often complex conditions are required beyond the standard properties
(continuity, weak ordering, stochastic dominance). Luce and Fishburn [22] use a condi-
tion termed compound gamble and joint receipt (see also [21]). Tversky and Kahneman
[33], Wakker and Tversky [34], Chateauneuf and Wakker [5] and Schmidt [29] use sign-
dependent comonotonic tradeoﬀ-consistency. The conditions can be less complex if a
particular parametric form for utility is desired. Wakker and Zank [35] use a general-
ization of constant proportional risk aversion to incorporate losses and derive CPT with
utility as power function. Zank [37] provides a model where utility is exponential or linear
by requiring constant absolute risk aversion for gains and separately for losses. These two
models are analyzed in more detail in the next section. Schmidt and Zank [30] use a
condition called independence of common increments to derive a model where utility is
linear for losses and linear for gains.
Under expected utility risk aversion is equivalent to requiring concavity of the utility
function. Since the ﬂow of alternatives to expected utility theory many alternative notions
of risk aversion have been proposed and analyzed. The most prominent one deﬁnes risk
aversion as aversion to mean preserving spreads which is referred to as strong risk aversion.
This concept of risk aversion was introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz [27]. More pre-
cisely, an individual exhibits strong risk aversion if for all lotteries P =( p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)
7and all δ > 0 it follows that
(p1,x 1;...;pi,x i −
δ
pi
;...;pj,x j +
δ
pj
;...;pn,x n) < P,
whenever pi,p j > 0. Recall that due our notation δ must be chosen such that rank-
ordering of outcomes is maintained.
Several generalizations of strong risk aversion have been proposed by Chateauneuf,
Cohen, and Meilijson [4], and their implications on various decision models have been
studied. Strong risk aversion is a property which is model independent — i.e. deﬁned in
terms of preferences and not in terms of properties of the utility representation — and
this fact may explain its popularity. In the next theorem we present the implications of
strong risk aversion under general CPT. Some of our results are similar to those found for
RDU, which is the special case of CPT given by w+ ≡ w−. As shown by Chew, Karni,
and Safra [6], in the case of RDU utility has to be concave and the weighting function
has to be convex in order to satisfy strong risk aversion. In the theorem below we do
not assume any diﬀerentiability of the utility function, nor do we assume continuity of
the weighting functions on [0,1]. We rather adopt the approach of Ebert [9], who has
shown in a welfare theory setting that these assumptions can be relaxed. In this sense
Theorem 1 below also generalizes the existing results for rank-dependent expected utility
since Chew, Karni, and Safra [6] assumed Gˆ ateaux-diﬀerentiability.
Theorem 1 Suppose that cumulative prospect theory holds. Then the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
1. Strong risk aversion holds.
2. The weighting functions w+ and w− are convex and continuous on the half-open
interval [0,1), the utility function is concave on the domain of losses and also on
8the domain of gains. Moreover, the utility function and the weighting functions are
diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. In particular the left and right derivative of the
utility function at any outcome exists, as well as the left and right derivatives of the
weighting functions at any p in (0,1). Further, the following relationship is satisﬁed:
U0(0−)
U0(0+)
> sup
p∈(0,1)
w+0(p+)
w−0(p−)
.
¤
Theorem 1 shows that the utility function does not need to be concave on the entire
real line since convexity at the status quo is permitted. In the next section two special
cases of CPT are analyzed with respect to this issue and an example with convex utility
is derived.
The formula obtained in Theorem 1 can be used to derive a new measure of loss aver-
sion. Since in general U0(0−)/U0(0+) can be less than unity also in the case of strict risk
aversion some losses, however small they are, may not “loom larger than the correspond-
ing gains”, that is, not for all x>0w eh a v e|U(−x)| > U(x). Therefore, loss aversion
does only hold if U0(0−)/U0(0+) > 1. Note that an identical deﬁnition of loss aversion was
already proposed by Bernatzi and Thaler [2] and formalized by K¨ obberling and Wakker
[18]. The latter authors denote the ratio U0(0−)/U0(0+) as index of loss aversion (say λ)
and employ it in order to compare the degree of loss aversion between diﬀerent individuals.
If we want to derive a utility function in Theorem 1 which is overall concave then
U0(0−)/U0(0+) must be larger or equal to 1. Since the converse relationship holds as well
we can formulate the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Assume that CPT holds and that risk aversion is satisﬁed. Then, the
utility function is concave if and only if loss aversion holds. ¤
9Note that in the caseof RDU we have w+ ≡ w− and, therefore, supp∈(0,1)w+0(p+)/w−0(p−) >
1. Consequently, in this case strong risk aversion does always imply loss aversion and a
concave utility function on the entire domain.
For CPT, two examples which illustrate the issue of non-concavity of the utility func-
tion in a region around the status quo are presented in the next section.
3 Risk Aversion and Convex Utility
As already noted in the preceding section, the interest of economists in a particular
parametric form for utility has lead to simpler axiomatizationsof CPT. The ﬁrst functional
form for utility which we analyze here is linear/exponential utility. Zank [37] provides a
characterization of CPT with linear/exponential utility for decision under uncertainty. A
function U : IR → IR is from the increasing linear/exponential family for gains (losses) if
one of the following holds for all x > 0( x 6 0):
(i) U(x)=αx, with α > 0,
(ii) U(x)=αeγx + τ, with αγ > 0 and τ ∈ IR.
Under CPT utility satisﬁes U(0) = 0. Therefore, in (i) we dropped the location
parameter, and in (ii) the only possibility for the location parameter is τ = −α. In the
above deﬁnition only the functional form of utility is described. Clearly the parameters
α,γ can be diﬀerent for gains (say α+,γ+) than for losses (say α−,γ−). The following
result holds if we assume CPT with linear/exponential utility in Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Suppose that cumulative prospect theory holds with linear/exponential util-
ity. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
101. Strong risk aversion holds.
2. The weighting functions w+ and w− are convex and continuous on the half-open
interval [0,1), the utility function is concave on the domain of losses and concave
on the domain of gains. Moreover, the weighting functions are diﬀerentiable almost
everywhere. In particular the left and right derivative of the utility function at any
outcome exists, as well as the left and right derivatives of the weighting functions at
any p in (0,1). Further, the following relationship is satisﬁed:
λ :=

  
  
α−γ−/α+γ+ if utility is exponential
α−/α+ if utility is linear

  
  
> sup
p∈(0,1)
w+0(p+)
w−0(p−)
,
where λ denotes the index of loss aversion. ¤
If the utility function in the above corollary is exponential for both, gains and losses,
then Statement 2, which says that utility is concave on the loss-domain and concave on
the gain domain, implies that the involved parameters are all negative. We can use this
result to design an example which shows that utility is not necessarily concave on the
entire domain. Suppose that for some positive α the utility function is deﬁned as
U(x)=

  
  
−exp(−x)+1 ,x > 0,
−α(exp(−x) − 1),x 6 0,
and for some positive β the weighting functions are deﬁned as
w
+(p)=

  
  
exp(p)−1
4(e−1) ,p ∈ [0,1),
1,p =1 ,
and
w
−(p)=

  
  
βw+(p),p ∈ [0,1),
1,p =1 .
11Obviously, CPT holds and Statement 2 in the above corollary is satisﬁed if αβ > 1.
Hence, risk aversion holds. However, utility is not concave for α < 1. Non-concavity of
the utility will occur if for example α =0 .9 and β =2 .
The next corollary is focusing on a result of Wakker and Zank [35], in which utility is
a two-sided power function of the following form:
U(x)=

  
  
σ+xα, with σ+ > 0,α > 0, for all x > 0,
−σ−|x|β, with σ− > 0,β > 0, for all x 6 0.
This form for utility under CPT has been proposed by Tversky and Kahneman [33] and is
the most used parametric form in empirical and theoretical applications (many references
are given in [35]). If we assume CPT with power utility in Theorem 1 then the following
result holds.
Corollary 4 Suppose that cumulative prospect theory holds with power utility. Then
the following two statements are equivalent:
1. Strong risk aversion holds.
2. The weighting functions w+ and w− are convex and continuous on the half-open
interval [0,1), the utility function is linear on the domain of losses and also on
the domain of gains. Moreover, the weighting functions are diﬀerentiable almost
everywhere. In particular the left and right derivative of the utility function at any
outcome exists, as well as the left and right derivatives of the weighting functions at
any p in (0,1). Further, the following relationship is satisﬁed:
λ :=
σ−
σ+ > sup
p∈(0,1)
w+0(p+)
w−0(p−)
,
where λ denotes the index of loss aversion. ¤
12This result shows that risk aversion and convex utility can coexist under CPT. Assume
that CPT holds with the following utility function
U(x)=

  
  
σ+x, x > 0,
σ−x, x 6 0,
and the weighting functions
w
+(p)=

  
  
p/4,p ∈ [0,1),
1,p =1 ,
and
w
−(p)=

  
  
p/2,p ∈ [0,1),
1,p =1 .
Then for σ+ =1 ,σ− =0 .9 the conditions in Statement 2 of the above corollary are
satisﬁed, and obviously utility is convex, due to the fact that utility is less steep for losses
than for gains (i.e. 1 = σ+ > σ− =0 .9).
The reason why in this example we have loss seeking is that the weighting functions
are allowed to be discontinuous at 1. If we require continuity of the weighting functions
on [0,1], as is often done in the literature, loss-seeking behavior cannot occur. In that case
continuity and convexity of the weighting functions imply that supp∈(0,1)[w+0(p+)/w−0(p−)]
will be at least 1, and utility must be concave on the entire domain. The proof is simple.
If w− is above w+ then for p close to 1 we have w−0(p−) 6 w+0(p+). Similarly, if w− is
below w+ then for p close to 0 we have w−0(p−) 6 w+0(p+). If neither of the previous
cases holds, then the two weighting functions must intersect. In that case there exists an
interval in [0,1] where either w− is above w+ or w− is below w+ and where w− is below
w+ at the boundary of the interval. Using similar arguments as above, we can conclude
the existence of some p ∈ (0,1) with w−0(p−) 6 w+0(p+).
13This analysis is independent of the chosen utility function, and therefore it holds in
general. This shows that, while under RDU assuming a continuous or discontinuous
weighting function is irrelevant for the shape of the utility function, here the assumption
of continuous weighting functions is crucial and forces utility to be concave. We get the
following result.
Lemma 5 Suppose that CPT holds and that strong risk aversion is satisﬁed. Further,
assume that the weighting functions are continuous on [0,1]. Then, loss seeking behavior
is excluded, i.e. the utility function is concave. ¤
4 Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Let us ﬁrst assume Statement 1 and derive Statement 2. Sup-
pose strong risk aversion holds and as well CPT. In what follows we prove that if the
outcomes are gains or zero then utility must be concave and the weighting function w+
convex. Then a similar result is derived for the case of losses (or zero): again utility is
concave and the weighting function w− is convex. In both cases we cannot rely on results
from the literature as our assumptions are weaker: we do not assume diﬀerentiability of
the utility function, neither do we assume continuity of the weighting functions. We will
show that the additional assumptions are not necessary.(It has been shown in Lemma 5
that such additional assumptions are rather restrictive under CPT.)
The ﬁnal step in the derivation of Statement 2 is to consider the mixed outcome case.
Step 1: Outcomes are gains or they are the status quo.
First we consider the lottery P := (p1,x 1;...;pi,x i;pi+1,x i+1;...;pn,x n). Strong risk
14aversion implies that
(p1,x 1;...;pi,x i −
δ
pi
;pi+1,x i+1 +
δ
pi+1
;...;pn,x n) < P
whenever δ ∈ [0,(xi − xi+1)/2]. After elimination of common terms, substitution of CPT
gives
πi[U(xi) − U(xi −
δ
pi
)] 6 πi+1[U(xi+1 +
δ
pi+1
) − U(xi+1)],
or equivalently
pi+1πi
piπi+1
6
[U(xi+1 + δ/pi+1) − U(xi+1)]
δ/pi+1
δ/pi
[U(xi) − U(xi − δ/pi)]
.
Now we use the fact that the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing, hence
diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. Then we can choose xi,x i+1 such that derivative at
those values is well deﬁned. Then, for δ → 0 it must hold that
pi+1πi
piπi+1
6
U0(xi+1)
U0(xi)
,
and by letting xi → xi+1 in the limit, we ﬁnd
pi+1πi
piπi+1
6 1,
or
πi
pi
6
πi+1
pi+1
.
This shows that for any selection of probabilities we have
w+(
Pi
j=1 pj) − w+(
Pi−1
j=1 pj)
pi
6
w+(
Pi+1
j=1pj) − w+(
Pi
j=1pj)
pi+1
,
or equivalently that the weighting function w+ is convex.
It can now be shown that the weighting function w+, which is strictly increasing
satisfying w+(0) = 0 and w+(1) = 1, is continuous on [0,1). Convexity and monotonicity
15are suﬃcient for the derivation of this property. Now we use the fact that a monotonic
continuous function is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. In addition the weighting function
w+ is convex, and this means that its left and right derivative at each point in (0,1) exists
as well as the right derivative at 0.
For this case it remains to show that the utility function is concave. Strong risk
aversion implies that
(1/2,x 1 − δ;1/2,x 2 + δ) < (1/2,x 1;1/2,x 2)
whenever δ ∈ [0,(x1 − x2)/2]. After elimination of common terms, substitution of CPT
gives
[w
+(1/2)][U(x1) − U(x1 − δ)] 6 [1 − w
+(1/2)][U(x2 + δ) − U(x2)],
and using the convexity of w+ and the continuity at 1/2w eﬁnd
1 6
[U(x2 + δ) − U(x2)]
[U(x1) − U(x1 − δ)]
.
With δ =1 /2(x1 − x2) we derive
U(x1)+U(x2)
2
6 U(
(x1 + x2)
2
),
which implies concavity of the utility function, as xi,x i+1 were arbitrary (gains).
In order to show that the left and right derivative of U exists at any gain outcome, note
that a similar argument as in the case of the weighting function w+ applies here. However,
because the domain of the utility function is unbounded from above, we conclude that the
left and right derivatives of the utility function at each point x>0 exist and in particular
the right derivative at the status quo is well deﬁned.
Step 2: Outcomes are losses or they are the status quo.
16The proof is similar to the one in the previous case. Therefore, we can conclude that
the utility function is concave for losses and that the weighting function w− is convex.
Moreover, continuity of w− on [0,1) is satisﬁed and the left and right derivative of w−
exists for each point in (0,1), in particular the right derivative of w− at 0 is well deﬁned.
Similarly to the previous case we can conclude that the utility function U is diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere, and that the left and right derivative exists at any x<0. In addition
the left derivative of U at 0 is well deﬁned, and in general it may not agree with the right
derivative established in step 1 of this proof.
Step 2: Outcomes are gains or losses.
This step will focus entirely on the derivation of the inequality in Statement 2 of the
theorem. Suppose we have a lottery P =( p1,x 1;...;pk,x k;pk+1,x k+1;...;pn,x n), where
xk > 0 >x k+1. Then strong risk aversion implies
(p1,x 1;...;pk,x k −
δ
pk
;pk+1,x k+1 +
δ
pk+1
;...;pn,x n) < P.
Let now δ be small enough such that xk − δ > 0 >x k+1 + δ. Substitution of CPT gives
πk[U(xk) − U(xk −
δ
pk
)] 6 πk+1[U(xk+1 +
δ
pk+1
) − U(xk+1)].
Therefore, for any xk > 0 >x k+1 and any probabilities pk,p k+1 the following must be
satisﬁed:
[U(xk) − U(xk − δ
pk)]
[U(xk+1 + δ
pk+1) − U(xk+1)]
6
[w−(
Pk+1
j=1 pj) − w−(
Pk
j=1 pj)]
[w+(
Pk
j=1 pj) − w+(
Pk−1
j=1 pj)]
.
We can write this inequality as
[U(xk) − U(xk − δ
pk)]/ δ
pk
[U(xk+1 + δ
pk+1) − U(xk+1)]/ δ
pk+1
6
[w−(
Pk+1
j=1 pj) − w−(
Pk
j=1 pj)]/pk+1
[w+(
Pk
j=1 pj) − w+(
Pk−1
j=1 pj)]/pk
.
17This inequality needs to be satisﬁed for all xk > 0 >x k+1, all probabilities p1,...,p n and
any appropriate δ. Hence,
sup
xk>0>xk+1
δ>0
[U(xk) − U(xk − δ
pk)]/ δ
pk
[U(xk+1 + δ
pk+1) − U(xk+1)]/ δ
pk+1
6 inf
p1,...,pn
[w−(
Pk+1
j=1 pj) − w−(
Pk
j=1 pj)]/pk+1
[w+(
Pk
j=1 pj) − w+(
Pk−1
j=1 pj)]/pk
must hold. We now use the concavity of the utility function and the convexity of the
weighting functions and derive
sup
xk>0>xk+1
U0(x
+
k )
U0(x
−
k+1)
6 inf
p∈(0,1)
w−0(p−)
w+0(p+)
,
or further using concavity of the utility function on the gain domain and on the loss
domain:
U0(0+)
U0(0−)
6 inf
p∈(0,1)
w−0(p−)
w+0(p+)
.
This inequality is equivalent to
U0(0−)
U0(0+)
6 sup
p∈(0,1)
w+0(p+)
w−0(p−)
,
which concludes the proof of Statement 2.
Let us now assume that Statement 2 holds. The proof of Statement 1 follows from
the fact that under CPT strong risk aversion is equivalent to
pjπi
piπj
6
[U(xj + δ/pj) − U(xj)]
δ/pj
δ/pi
[U(xi) − U(xi − δ/pi)]
,
for any xi >x j and probabilities pi + pj 6 1, and appropriate δ > 0. For each of the
three cases (xi >x j > 0, 0 >x i >x j, xi > 0 >x j) this inequality follows from continuity
of the diﬀerent functions and the convexity of the weighting functions together with the
concavity of U for gains and for losses. For the derivation of the case xi > 0 >x j the
inequality in statement 2 of the theorem is needed. This concludes the proof of Theorem
1. ¤
18Proof of Corollary 2: The proof follows immediately from the new deﬁnition of loss
aversion: λ = U0(0−)/U0(0+). ¤
Proof of Corollary 3: The proof follows from substitution of the particular form for
the utility function in Theorem 1. ¤
Proof of Corollary 4: The proof follows from substitution of the particular form for
the utility function in Theorem 1. ¤
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